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Abstract
The operating room (OR) is a complex environment that involves large teams and multiple 
competing priorities, dynamically interacting throughout the entire course of a surgical pro-
cedure. The simultaneous presence of flammable substances, volatile gases, and the frequent 
use of electrical current results in a potentially dangerous combination. Operating room fire 
(ORF) is a rare but potentially devastating occurrence. To prevent this “never event”, it is 
critical for institutions to establish and follow proper fire safety protocols. Adherence to 
proven prevention strategies and awareness of associated risk factors will help reduce the 
incidence of this dreaded safety event. When ORF does occur despite strict adherence to 
established safety protocols, the entire OR team should know the steps required to contain 
and extinguish the fire as well as essential measures to minimize or avoid thermal injury. If 
injury does occur, it is important to recognize and treat it promptly. Appropriate and honest 
disclosure to all injured persons and their families should be made without delay. As with 
all serious patient safety events, regulatory reporting and root cause determinations must 
take place in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. The goal of patient safety 
champions at each institution should be the attainment of zero incidence of ORF.
Keywords: operating room fire, patient safety, prevention, surgical fire, surgical safety, 
intraoperative fire, operating room, patient safety, prevention
1. Introduction
Although rare, ORFs continue to occur despite staff education and preventive efforts [1, 2]. 
The scope of patient harm spans an entire spectrum, from aborted surgery to fatal injuries [3]. 
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
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distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Although all ORFs should be potentially preventable, their rarity combined with relatively 
more focus on other OR complications contribute to knowledge gaps and inconsistent 
approaches to stop these “never events” [4, 5]. Institutions must overcome common misun-
derstandings about risk factors associated with ORFs including the misconceptions that fires 
are largely nonpreventable, staff is appropriately trained in fire safety and aware of critical 
actions required in an ignition event, and fires do not happen at institutions with well-devel-
oped cultures of safety [2].
The abovementioned fallacies must be actively countered at all levels of the establish-
ment from the executive suite to the equipment maintenance staff. Continuous education, 
including didactic sessions, web-based self-assessment activities, multimedia materials, 
and readiness drills, form the foundation of organizational excellence that is based on the 
combination of high performing teams, well-designed safety protocols, and zero toler-
ance for complacency [6, 7]. When implementing and disseminating information about 
operating room fire safety, all stakeholders must be actively engaged, including nursing 
staff, surgical technologists, anesthesia professionals and surgeons. As with other forms of 
patient safety events, effective communication is essential in both prevention and manage-
ment of ORFs [8]. It is also important to note that the healthcare environment is inherently 
more prone to fires than other nonindustrial workplace environments, primarily due to 
the coexisting use of flammable materials and surgical energy sources [8]. As such, other 
locations within hospitals may be at elevated risk of procedure-related fires, including the 
emergency department, labor and delivery, and endoscopy suites [9]. In this chapter, we 
present two realistic clinical vignettes describing ORFs. Detailed discussion of risk factors, 
preventive strategies, fire preparedness, and post-event management then follows.
2. Clinical vignette #1
Mr. “A” is a 65-year-old male admitted to a local Ambulatory Surgery Center for a minor 
surgical procedure. He has cervical lymphadenopathy and is scheduled for excisional 
biopsy of a palpably enlarged right-sided cervical lymph node. After all preoperative 
medical and safety checks are completed, Mr. “A” is escorted into the OR and positioned 
supine. General anesthesia is induced after an uneventful endotracheal intubation. The 
surgical resident assisting with the procedure preps the patient’s neck, shoulder and chest 
using alcohol-containing chlorhexidine solution. Soon after, the surgical site is draped 
with sterile surgical cotton drapes. An incision is made over the enlarged lymph node, 
and subcutaneous tissue is exposed. Electrocautery is then introduced into the field for 
hemostasis and surgical dissection around the enlarged lymph node. Immediately follow-
ing electrode activation, a flame ignites and rapidly spreads over the surgical field prepped 
with chlorhexidine. The surgeon in charge immediately removes the drapes, the electro-
cautery is switched off, the fire is extinguished within seconds, and the lymph node biopsy 
procedure is aborted. The patient suffers from first degree burns over his neck and chest. 
His recovery is complete, although he requires another trip to the OR for completion of his 
lymph node biopsy.
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3. Clinical vignette #2
Mrs. “W” is a 75-year-old female, admitted to the intensive care unit (ICU) for severe pneumo-
nia. She subsequently developed respiratory failure and was unable to successfully wean from 
mechanical ventilatory support. Consequently, she was scheduled for a tracheostomy due to 
anticipated prolonged need for mechanical ventilation. On the morning of surgery, the patient 
was transferred directly from the ICU to the OR, with required preoperative safety checks per-
formed at her bedside in the ICU. After the anesthesiologist administered total intravenous anes-
thesia, the surgical intern prepped and draped the patient’s neck in the usual sterile fashion. The 
surgeon proceeded to perform a transverse incision above the suprasternal notch and dissected 
down to the trachea using a combination of sharp (scissors) and blunt techniques. The trachea 
was subsequently exposed and, with appropriate anesthesia (lowering of inspired oxygen con-
centration) and surgical team (abstinence from electrocautery) precautions, incised sharply. 
Without consulting the attending surgeon, the surgical intern suddenly noticed significant 
amount of bleeding in the area of the retracted strap muscles and proceeded to use coagulating 
diathermy to secure hemostasis. Immediately following the use of diathermy, a loud noise was 
heard and a large flame burst from the tracheal stoma. Ventilation was immediately stopped, 
the anesthesia circuit was disconnected from the tracheal tube, and the fire rapidly extinguished 
using normal saline administered through the endotracheal tube. Without delay, the surgeon 
gained access into the trachea with a tracheostomy cannula and once the positioning of the tra-
cheostomy device was confirmed, the endotracheal tube was removed. The endotracheal tube 
was notably burned, with carbonized plastic material visible in the distal portion. The patient 
suffered superficial thickness burns around the stoma site. Fiberoptic bronchoscopy demon-
strated minimal burn injury around the tracheostomy site and the proximal airway. Fortunately, 
the patient recovered without other major complications and was discharged from the hospital 
to rehabilitation facility after successful tracheostomy decannulation 2 weeks later.
4. Risk factors for fire in the operating room
Key risk factors for ORF should be well known to all OR team members, should be included 
as standard parts of staff educational curriculum, and should be readily identified when-
ever present (alone or in combination) [10, 11]. According to Apfelbaum et al., prevention of 
ORFs begins with minimizing patient exposure to the presence, alone or in combination, of 
“oxidizer-enriched atmosphere,” potential ignition source(s)/surgical energy device(s), flam-
mable liquids (e.g., alcohol-based surgical prep), and other potentially flammable materials 
(e.g., paper or plastic drapes) [12]. Mandych and his group reported an intraoperative fire that 
occurred during tracheostomy placement for a patient who had an unresectable lingual carci-
noma [13]. When attempting to recreate the circumstances of the fire under laboratory condi-
tions, they found that electrocautery did not ignite any towels, sponges, or other materials 
without the presence of oxygen. The authors concluded that an “ignition source,” a “combus-
tible agent,” and oxygen were necessary for a fire to occur. Interestingly, they also cited the 
organic gases which emanated from the necrotic tumor to be a potential source of combustible 
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material [13]. Ladas and colleagues have also cited the potential for colonic gas explosion, 
though arguably this is a very rare scenario and preventive measures seem limited. In their 
review, they found 11 cases of colonic gas explosion during surgery and nine cases during 
colonoscopy. Looking back to the 1980s when mannitol was used as the most common bowel 
prep agent, colonic aspiration evaluation revealed a high concentration of hydrogen in the 
colon secondary to the mannitol’s fermentation by E. coli. Though mannitol has largely gone 
by the wayside, there are still polyethylene glycol solutions with sorbitol, which, if the sorbi-
tol is malabsorbed, can result in formation of combustible gases due to the same fermentation 
process [14]. Not only is this the case, but sorbitol is present in one’s daily diet and malabsorp-
tion of sorbitol has been found in up to 60% of normal, healthy patients [15].
A rather thorough set of experiments were performed by Barker and Polson after a 73-year-
old man’s case of bilateral burr holes for evacuation of subdural hematomas ended up in an 
OR fire. Having experienced this, the group decided to embark on laboratory simulations 
using a nonflammable plastic manikin and concluded the following: (1) even without oxygen, 
paper drapes could be ignited by the electrocautery knife, but that fire was slow-burning and 
self-resolving; (2) when 5-min drying time was implemented, or if no alcohol based solution 
Risk factors for operating room fires
Ignition sources
• Electrosurgical and electrocautery units
• Electrical hemostatic devices
• Lasers
• Fiberoptic light sources and cables
• Defibrillators
• Flexible endoscopes
• Sparks from surgical drills
Fuel sources
• Flammable prepping agents including tinctures (chlorhexidine, thiomersal, iodophor)
• Drapes, towels, surgical sponges, dressings
• Gowns, hoods, masks
• Mattresses, pillows, blankets






Risks are grouped by their primary category of “ignition source,” “fuel source,” and “oxygen source.”
Table 1. Listing of major risk factors for operating room fire.
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was used, there was no resultant fire; (3) in the absence of closed spaces where oxygen or 
vapor from the prep solution could gather, there was no fire. In this context, the authors found 
that the concentrations of oxygen under drapes could be as high as 50% [16].
Overview of major risk factors for ORF, grouped according to specific risk contribution, is 
provided in Table 1 and Figure 1. Additionally, when considering and conducting the assess-
ment, consideration of the delivery method of oxygen is a critical component. The use of a 
laryngeal mask airway or an endotracheal tube reduces the risk of fire by decreasing the oxy-
gen concentration under the drapes and in the patient’s upper airway [17].
From procedure-based standpoint, operations can be categorized as “general risk” or “high-
risk” for ORF [12, 18]. For “general risk” procedures, such as abdominal hernia repairs, any 
flammable skin-prepping solutions should not be allowed to pool and must be dry before the 
placement of surgical drapes [19]. Assurance of the same is required before using any surgical 
energy devices (e.g., electrocautery or laser) [19, 20]. In addition, surgical drapes should be 
applied in a manner that prevents oxygen from flowing into the surgical site or pooling near 
Figure 1. Components of the “fire triangle” that interact to create conditions ultimately responsible for various degrees 
of risk for operating room fire.
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the operative field [12, 21]. Finally, surgical gauzes and sponges should be moistened when 
used in proximity to any potential source of ignition [22].
Examples of “high-risk” procedures include tracheostomy creation (e.g., direct exposure of surgi-
cal field to highly concentrated oxygen) or maxillofacial/head and neck surgery (e.g., close prox-
imity between the endotracheal airway and surgical energy source) [23–25]. For such “high-risk” 
procedures, where proximity exists between an oxidizer and an ignition source, special caution 
is required by the entire OR team, including close communication and coordination between the 
surgeon and the anesthesiologist, as well as the use of operating field suctioning to scavenge any 
excess oxygen [12]. This is demonstrated well in our Clinical Vignette #2, where both the surgeon 
and the anesthesiologist took immediate and appropriate course of action. In addition to avoid-
ing/limiting the use of nitrous oxide, the concentration of oxygen being delivered to the patient 
should be minimized, preferably based on close monitoring of patient oxygenation (e.g., pulse 
oximetry, and if possible tracking of inspired/expired/delivered oxygen concentration) [12].
The use of surgical laser equipment in a high-risk area (e.g., head and neck, trachea) should 
be done in the presence of laser “resistant” tracheal tubes, intended specifically for a given 
procedure and type of laser [12, 26, 27]. For any operative work requiring surgical energy 
application within the airway, reduction in oxygen or nitrous oxide concentration is thought 
to be safe for anywhere between 1 and 5 min at a time [12]. The same applies to procedures 
involving immediate proximity of the oxidizer and surgical energy source in the setting of 
nasal cannula or face mask [12]. Surgical suction should be utilized to scavenge oxygen or 
nitrous oxide from the oropharynx during cases involving this anatomic area [26].
5. Operating room fire: true magnitude of the problem
According to the Emergency Care Research Institute (ECRI), approximately 200–240 surgical 
fires occur each year in the United States [28]. Other sources provide a much wider range of 
occurrences, ranging between 100 and 2260 annually [2, 24, 29, 30]. Generally speaking, the 
incidence of ORF appears to be similar to that of wrong-site surgery or retained surgical items 
[28], some of the most prominent categories of surgical “never events” [31–33]. As outlined in 
previous sections, the simultaneous presence of key components required for the ignition of a 
fire is the single biggest risk determinant (Table 1 & Figure 1). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
surgical fires involve electrosurgical equipment in approximately 67–90% of all cases, and that 
supplemental oxygen administration was nearly universally present [2, 34]. Of importance, the 
operative environment is defined as being “oxygen-enriched” when the oxygen concentration 
is greater than 21% [17]. Most commonly and not surprisingly, given the previously outlined 
risk factors, ORFs result in burns to the head, face, neck, and upper chest [22]. Thankfully not 
all ORFs involve patients, operating room staff, or result in significant injury [2].
6. The fire triangle: focus on education and knowledge
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the initiation (and propagation) of ORF is dependent on 
the simultaneous presence of an ignition source (e.g., surgical energy device), fuel (e.g., paper 
drapes, alcohol-based skin prep), and an oxidizer (e.g., oxygen, nitrous oxide) [22]. Figure 1 lists 
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common types of items and categories within the “fire triangle” paradigm. Although beyond 
the scope of the current discussion, it is also important to mention that non-anesthetic causes of 
ORFs have been reported, including flammable gastrointestinal gases (mentioned earlier in the 
chapter) [35, 36] and surgical lights [37].
The final component is an oxidizer [38]. Although most people realize that oxygen greatly 
enhances the rate of combustion, many do not know that nitrous oxide supports combustion 
in roughly similar manner. Oxidizers reduce the fuel ignition temperature, thus elevating the 
risk of a fire and its continued propagation [39].
7. Fire containment: strategies and procedures
In an event of a fire, healthcare facilities commonly employ the “rescue-alarm-confine-extin-
guish” or RACE protocol [40, 41]. All team members, regardless of assigned function or seniority, 
should be aware of the location of pertinent emergency equipment, including the “fire alarm” 
trigger, fire extinguisher, and phone/extension to be used for notification [42]. Within the OR 
environment, additional considerations may need to be taken into account, depending on specific 
circumstances, such as whether the fire involves the patient. Scenarios involving the patient (both 
cutaneous and within the airway) and those without patient involvement will now be discussed.
If the fire directly involves the patient, the initial steps should involve extinguishing the flames 
and removing any burning material from the patient [2, 43]. Simultaneously, other team mem-
bers should be tasked with initiating the established “fire response” protocol, including alarm 
notification, personnel evacuation, removal of flammable materials from the vicinity of the 
fire, as well as using fire extinguisher to contain and put out the fire [44, 45]. Alarm notification 
should clearly indicate the precise location of the fire and any critical information regarding the 
circumstances of the occurrence [42, 45]. Due to the risk of thermal injury, timing of actions and 
team coordination are critical. The administration of exogenous gases (oxygen and nitrous oxide) 
should be discontinued immediately. Once fire control is achieved, care for the patient should 
resume, with specific management based on the degree of danger from smoke in the area.
If the fire is not able to be immediately contained, then evacuation from the room, notification 
using established facility infrastructure (e.g., facility alarms, the emergency operator, and the 
OR operational leadership), and immediate notification of the fire department should take 
place. The surgeon typically recognizes the fire first and thus is involved in extinguishing and 
removing the fire, primarily by dousing the area with saline. Equipment immediately avail-
able in the event of an ORF includes ample supply of sterile saline or water; a “carbon dioxide” 
or a “water mist” fire extinguisher; replacement tracheal tubes, guides, and facemasks; rigid 
laryngoscope equipment; sponge and drape sets ready for rapid re-deployment; replacement 
ventilator circuits, tubes, and lines [2]. Because many drapes are waterproof, it is important for 
saline to cover all burning areas. If saline is not available, moist surgical towels draped across 
the operator’s forearms may be used to smother the flames, with a sweeping motion away 
from the patient’s airway. Of note, patting a fire may cause the flames to worsen [46].
During tracheostomy placement and other tracheal procedures, the fire may directly involve 
the patient’s airway [47]. Although rare, this type of event can be fatal [48]. Due to its ana-
tomic location, fire in the tracheobronchial tree is approached differently compared to other 
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circumstances. As soon as the airway fire is recognized, the administration of all gases by 
anesthesia must be stopped and the tracheal tube removed (to prevent plastic melting within 
the airway and the oropharynx) [2, 48]. Any items at risk of ignition should also be immedi-
ately removed, followed by the administration of saline or water into the airway [2]. After the 
fire is extinguished, the patient can be reintubated and ventilated, provided that no smolder-
ing materials remain [2, 48]. Concentration of administered oxygen can be increased after 
the risk of re-ignition is no longer present. It is important for OR teams to remember that a 
tracheostomy procedural setup should include a readily available source of saline, preferably 
in a large syringe suitable for direct and immediate intra-tracheal administration.
One important, and thankfully exceedingly rare consideration is the secondary ignition of the 
operating room team’s gowns, gloves, possibly resulting in thermal injuries among operating 
team members [49]. Electrical injury causing harm to hospital staff has also been described [50]. 
Although generally underreported, these and other similar scenarios may put at risk both the 
patient and his or her caretakers, especially when the fire is intense, when an explosion occurs, 
or when heavy smoke causes inhalation injury [49, 51, 52]. Also of importance is the need for 
the OR staff to be aware of the potential for patient thermal injuries from improperly placed 
electrocautery grounding pads [53].
In fires that occur in the operating suite or its immediate proximity, not involving the patient, 
the source is usually related to faulty electrical equipment or wires [2, 53]. In case of such occur-
rence, the initial step is to turn off (if possible, of course) and then safely unplug the affected 
equipment and remove it physically to reduce any potential future threat of fire [53]. However, 
if this is not feasible, the device may need to be extinguished in its stationary location [2].
Fire extinguishers using carbon dioxide should be readily available, easily accessible, and 
regularly checked for operational readiness [25]. Consequently, extinguishers must be clearly 
identified by an appropriate sign, and each employee should be familiar with operational 
characteristics of these life-saving tools. It has also been recommended that extinguishers 
should be located near pull stations, stairwells, and fire exits [2]. All fire extinguishers used 
in the OR are of the ABC variety, meaning that they are effective across all major fire types 
(A, ordinary combustibles; B, flammable liquids; C, electricity) [41]. The dry chemical fire 
retardant used is ammonium phosphate and is mildly corrosive in moist environments. If 
the patient becomes the fuel source, a CO
2
 extinguisher (effective on electrical fires and flam-
mable liquids) would be preferable because of its lack of ammonium phosphate and thus 
less potential for contamination and tissue damage. Proper extinguisher use can be described 
using the PASS (pull pin, aim, squeeze, and sweep) acronym [54].
Strategically located, centrally monitored fire, smoke, and heat sensors must be present and 
fully functional at each healthcare facility, including all procedure/operating rooms [55]. 
Additionally, fire alarm pull stations should be located near evacuation stairwells and other pre-
designated locations. When any fire is present, both visual (strobe lights) and audible alarms 
should activate [2]. The hospital fire response plan should immediately go into effect, notify-
ing designated fire response team about where to respond. The response team includes but is 
not limited to security and facility management personnel. Determinations regarding resource 
mobilization and whether to initiate additional evacuation procedures should also be made.
Vignettes in Patient Safety - Volume 3168
In addition to the primary location of the ORF, the alarms should also sound on the floor 
above and below the fire. Although this may seem obvious in larger hospitals, where fire 
alarm notifications are usually announced throughout the entire building, some smaller facili-
ties may require specific modifications to ensure this important safety feature. In the case of 
hospital fire alarm activation, the on-site safety team must determine whether an evacuation 
is necessary [2, 56]. This is especially important when one considers the risks associated with 
moving patients who are critically ill or actively undergoing surgery. Thus, in the event of an 
actual fire, personnel would be notified of detailed plan(s) to have the fire contained and con-
trolled to facilitate safe and orderly evacuation of the involved building or structure [57–60]. 
Operating room personnel should conduct an assessment of specific patient needs such as 
monitoring equipment, ventilator availability and appropriate transport platform to safely 
perform evacuation procedures. Central to the ability to quickly and safely evacuate large 
number of patients and personnel is the need for specialized infrastructure, including critical 
components such as “fire-safe” elevators [56].
Gas shut-off valves are used to stop the flow of anesthetic gases into the ORs and are designed 
for easy access. The front of these gas supply consoles should be clear of medical equipment 
and clutter at all times [61]. The gas shut-off procedure should be managed using preexisting 
plans and/or protocols, again emphasizing staff education and periodic team drills. All perti-
nent equipment should be clearly labeled, including the relationship between valve position 
and its functional state [61, 62]. As with other emergencies that may involve limited visibility 
and/or lack of power, emergency lighting, battery-operated safety equipment, and any smoke 
management devices should be available and operational [63–65].
8. Consequences of fire in the OR: thermal injury
It has been noted that approximately two-thirds of surgical fires occur on the patient while 
approximately one-third occur in a cavitary location (e.g., airway) [17]. In terms of decreasing 
frequency of anatomic locations, approximately 40–45% ORFs involve the head, neck, and 
upper chest; about 25% involve other “external” body areas; and finally about 20% occur in 
the airway, with the remainder occurring in other “cavitary” locations [17].
In addition to traditional electrocautery equipment, various forms of devices utilizing dif-
ferent types of nonionizing radiant energy have been introduced into medical applications, 
including ultraviolet, visible light, microwaves, and radio-frequency waves [66, 67]. Starting 
with overall exposure and risk reduction, providers must be aware of the potential dangers—
as well as the full spectrum of possible injury—associated with these devices [66, 68]. Prompt 
recognition and timely management of injuries from both direct thermal exposure and other 
forms of “surgical energy” misapplication cannot be overstressed. This includes immedi-
ate attention to any injuries sustained by the patient and/or staff [29, 69, 70]. Thermal burns 
are associated with coagulation necrosis of the involved tissues, with the degree of severity 
depending on the temperature and the duration of the exposure. The initial tissue response 
primarily results from the direct transfer of energy in the localized area of injury, resulting in 
protein denaturation and coagulation [68, 71–73].
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In case of cutaneous burn, skin is an effective thermal barrier, causing most of the immediate 
damage to be confined to epidermis and dermis. At the same time, various humoral mediators 
(cytokines, prostaglandins, oxygen free radicals, histamine, complement) are released that may 
result in vasoactive response, increased capillary permeability, and the appearance of local as 
well as distal tissue edema. Beyond the general pathophysiology of the burn wound, additional 
factors contributing to the overall physiologic response include resuscitation fluid administra-
tion, effects of various therapeutic agents, impaired host defense leading to elevated risk of infec-
tion, endocrine system changes, and the associated hypermetabolic state that affects metabolism 
across a broad range of tissues (e.g., muscle, liver, kidneys, gastrointestinal tract) [73].
If airway or intracavitary fire is present, the abovementioned considerations may become 
amplified, potentially worsening the clinical prognosis [35, 74, 75]. Injuries involving the air-
way may become life threatening if not promptly and properly managed [48]. More specifi-
cally, what may appear to be a minor injury can result in severe tissue edema that severely 
restricts or obstructs an airway over the course of a few hours [74, 76, 77]. Long-term follow-
up is required in cases of severe airway injury [78].
9. Medico-legal, reputational, and regulatory implications of ORF
Additional consequences of ORFs, above and beyond direct patient harm, include serious 
medico-legal repercussions, financial costs, and severe reputational damage to both involved 
providers and their institutions [79, 80]. Moreover, such events inculcate mistrust toward the 
healthcare system among the public [80]. Although the majority of patients who sustain medi-
cal injury do not file lawsuits, the medical system is riddled with an abundance of frivolous 
claims, the cost of which is not trivial [81–84]. It has also been noted that lack of provider 
awareness, combined with inadequate levels of communication, may result in elevated mal-
practice risk [85]. The development of appropriate internal reporting mechanisms and edu-
cational programs may help mitigate the overall legal risk associated with adverse events, 
including ORFs [85, 86]. Factors known to prevent litigation by patients who suffered compli-
cations include excellent surgeon-patient relationship, full and honest disclosure, and effec-
tive communication between patients, providers, and teams [87, 88].
Consequences of unusual or elevated incidence of ORFs can be significant, up to and includ-
ing mandatory closure of operative suites at an institution [2]. Consequently, thorough 
assessment of risks, institutional protocols, and employee competency in this critical area is 
mandatory [2]. Regular (e.g., quarterly) fire drills may help reinforce the knowledge of essen-
tial patient safety protocols and serve to refresh key information among the OR staff [89].
10. Checklists, communication, education, safety protocols, and 
teamwork
It has been noted that in the presence of all three components necessary for intraoperative fire igni-
tion, the risk of ORF may be further elevated by poor team communication and coordination [90]. 
From patient safety perspective, virtually all surgical fires should be preventable. Standardized 
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OR safety checklist aimed at reducing the risk of ORF, either alone or in combination with other 
existing checklists, has been proposed as one potential solution to the problem [91–93]. Another 
area where iatrogenic fires can occur, yet the issue appears to be relatively neglected despite some 
procedural similarities to the OR, is the clinical setting of the emergency department [94].
One important focus of existing guidelines (with some exceptions) is that the traditional practice 
of using highly concentrated oxygen should be discontinued during head, face, neck, and upper 
chest surgery [28, 46]. The recommended practice is to use medical air whenever possible in 
such cases, and if the patient’s condition warrants supplemental oxygen, additional precautions 
should be taken to protect the surgical field from oxygen “contamination” [2]. The exception to 
this rule would be a case in which a patient must remain responsive but requires supplemental 
oxygen while undergoing a procedure involving the head, face, neck, or upper chest. Under 
such circumstances, the lowest concentration of oxygen should be employed (e.g., 30%), and if 
concentrations exceed 30% prior to using any surgical energy source, one should stop oxygen 
and deliver medical air at 5–10 L/min for at least 1 min to dissipate any trapped oxygen [95, 96]. 
As previously outlined, tracheal incision should only be performed using “cold” devices such 
as scalpels or scissors. Finally, communication among the team members is essential, including 
universal patient safety education and utilization of patient safety checklists [97].
Because ORF requires the simultaneous presence of an oxidizer, an ignition source, and a 
fuel, the key to prevention is intentionally minimizing (or eliminating, if applicable) one or 
more of these components so combustion is not possible [98]. Thus, the overall framework 
for ORF prevention must incorporate specific steps to identify risk level for each surgical 
case, ensure proper use of surgical energy devices, safe and appropriate use of supplemental 
oxygen, excellent communication and coordination, as well as meticulous attention to detail 
when using any potentially flammable materials to prep and/or drape the surgical field [99]. 
The assessment of fire risk potential should take place during the universal surgical time-out 
for every single patient and for each individual procedure [99, 100]. The fire risk is calculated/
estimated by considering all possible risk factors associated with a particular surgical proce-
dure [101, 102]. The resulting “risk score” (with “1” representing “low risk,” “2” representing 
“intermediate risk,” and “3” representing “high risk”) should then be communicated to the 
surgical team during the “time out” or “pre-op briefing” [102].
In the OR, each healthcare worker takes the “ownership” of a part of the fire triangle. For 
example, alcohol-based skin preparations have become more common as a source of fuel 
since the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention identified them as the preferred skin 
disinfection method. Thus, the team member who applies the prep (e.g., circulating nurse) 
must work closely with the surgeon who controls the surgical energy device, and these stake-
holders must ensure that the potentially flammable prep agent is completely dry, without any 
identifiable pooling, before proceeding with the use of electrocautery [99].
One never knows who will be present when the fire occurs; thus, the role of each team 
member may change in any given scenario. A simplified guideline for all three broad types 
of ORF (e.g., involvement of airway, cutaneous/non-airway, and environment) is presented 
in Figure 2. High degree of flexibility on the part of all team members is required, and 
this can only be accomplished in the presence of meticulous preparation, optimized use 
of resources, readiness drills, simulation, and other forms of team practice [103, 104]. For 
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Figure 2. Schematic summary of guidelines for optimal approach to operating room fire. Note: Both carbon dioxide and 
“water mist” extinguishers can be utilized. Legend: CO
2
 = carbon dioxide; OR = operating room.
example, the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) strongly recommends fire safety 
simulation as a team preparedness tool [12, 89]. It is important that such simulations are 
as realistic as possible, and that “lessons learned” are discussed during a post-simulation 
debrief in a constructive, team-oriented fashion, and disseminated afterwards to all stake-
holders. Sharing of experiences between different institutions and teams is also very valu-
able. Helpful information regarding ORF prevention and management is available on the 
Internet, including the Association of periOperative Registered Nurses (AORN), Anesthesia 
Patient Safety Foundation (APSF), ASA, and Emergency Care Research Institute (ECRI) web-
sites [105–107]. Finally, in an event of a major unforeseen event in the OR, a crisis checklist 
has been proposed to help streamline decision-making and team processes required during 
an orderly response [108].
11. The importance of honest disclosure and risk management
Although uncommon, adverse events and clinical errors do occur, and physicians have an 
ethical and professional responsibility to honestly disclose such occurrences to patients [109]. 
Open discussion regarding unfavorable events is an indispensible component of effective clin-
ical risk management in health-care. Failure to do so undermines the public’s confidence in 
the medical profession and has the potential to create legal liability [110]. Moreover, patients 
need to be informed about medical errors so that additional harm can be avoided, and well-
informed decisions about their care can be made [111].
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Honest disclosure can be challenging for practitioners as it may be difficult to recognize errors 
openly before both patients and colleagues [112, 113]. In addition, physicians’ fear of litigation 
can also pose as a major barrier to frank disclosure [114]. However, when handled appropri-
ately, immediate and genuine disclosure of errors frequently leads to improved patient rapport 
and fewer malpractice claims [115, 116]. Practitioners are encouraged to follow hospital-specific 
guidelines for the disclosure of errors, patient safety events, and other risk management issues 
[117–119]. Disclosure needs to take place in an appropriate setting and at the right time, when 
the patient and/or their family is/are able to understand and sufficiently process the information 
provided. The surgeon should always take the lead and approach the patient/family with empa-
thy and concern [120]. Behavior that translates into acts of evasiveness or lack of understanding 
inculcates mistrust and anger in the patient, which may ultimately lead to a legal action against 
the physician and/or the hospital [121]. Manner and tone are extremely important aspects of 
disclosure and often more impactful than the actual content of the discussion. A simple “I am 
sorry” is often appreciated by the patients and results in a stronger patient-physician relation-
ship. In addition, it is important for the physician to articulate clearly what has been done to 
overcome consequences of the error and to reassure the patient and their family that every effort 
has been taken to prevent similar events from happening in the future [122].
Open physician-to-patient and physician-to-physician communication is a fundamental 
aspect of effective clinical risk management and cannot be overemphasized [110]. As outlined 
throughout the Vignettes in Patient Safety book cycle, every health-care organization should 
encourage the internal development of patient safety champions and strictly enforce policies 
and procedures that prevent occurrence of adverse events [32]. At the same time, when these 
incidents do occur, all team members (physicians and non-physicians) should be trained to 
report them without fearing backlash or facing undue blame [32, 33, 123].
12. Conclusions
Although rare, ORFs occur more often than most people realize. Fire safety in the OR is every 
team member’s responsibility, with attention to established safety protocols and focus on pre-
vention constituting the overarching priorities of intraoperative patient care. All stakeholders 
should be well aware of the “fire triangle” concept, and how the combination of an “ignition 
source,” “fuel source,” and “oxygen source” can create a potentially dangerous environment. 
When ORFs do occur, optimal outcomes depend on immediate recognition, appropriate 
response, and a coordinated team effort. The focus on team education/training and fire pre-
paredness (through regular exercises and simulations), along with a comprehensive fire safety 
program, constitute an integral part of preventing adverse occurrences. Patients entrust health-
care provider teams with their lives. With this trust comes the expectation that all team mem-
bers have excellent knowledge (and control) of risk factors potentially responsible for ORF 
occurrences. In order to further improve our collective understanding of ORFs, including quan-
titative risk-factor determination, future efforts should include the development of a national 
registry that will help facilitate prospective tracking of all ORF occurrences, including their rela-
tionship to known risk factors and documented risk-reduction strategies. Only when working 
together can we effectively achieve the “zero incidence” of major patient safety “never events.”
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